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CITIES AND RESCALING 
 
“Rather than promoting ‘balanced’ urban and regional development within relatively 
autocentric national space-economies, the overarching goal of urban locational 
policies is to position major cities and city-regions strategically within supranational 
circuits of capital accumulation.” 
(Brenner, 2009a: 125) 
Introduction: cities in retrospect and in prospect 
The last two decades have been dominated by discourses claiming a resurgence of cities. Yet 
in the early stages of globalization the prospects for cities looked bleak. The breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods monetary agreement, the ensuing oil crisis, global economic recession, 
and dissolution of the Fordist-Keynesian institutional compromise left those cities in the 
North Atlantic rim which had prospered most from Fordist mass production on the verge of 
bankruptcy by the late-1970s. Triggering an accelerated, crisis-induced phase of industrial 
restructuring, cities which had been expanding as a result of Fordist accumulation in the 
postwar period – in particular its unquenching demand for inputs and reliance on a deep 
reservoir of local labour – came under threat, globally, from increased foreign competition, 
capital mobility and labour migration, and were undermined, locally, by labour-
management disputes and stagflation. The result was major urbanised zones of Fordist 
accumulation (the German Ruhr district, the ‘snowbelt’ cities of northern and northeast 
United States, northern England and the Midlands) were no longer drivers of nationally-
specific systems of production. Rather mass unemployment, unprecedented levels of social 
upheaval, and general urban decay resulted in those industrial cities and regions which 
benefited most from Fordist accumulation becoming a serious drag on the national 
economies within which they were embedded.  
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The long-term outlook for cities also looked bleak. In the two decades following the 
collapse of Fordism, consensus suggested how advances in technology and communication 
were inducing an era of global deconcentration and with it a diminishing role for cities. Yet 
for all that new technologies have undoubtedly extended our capacity to interact and 
transfer information and commodities more freely and more frequently across space in 
capitalist globalization, the predicted decline of cities never materialised. In fact, the 
propensity of economic activity to cluster in dense agglomerations has seen consensus go 
the other way, as by the late-1980s mounting evidence affirmed how a distinctive group of 
cities, that is, metropolitan clusters of socioeconomic activity, were forging ahead as 
important command and control posts in the new global economy.  
This propensity for globalization to crystallise out in nodes of dense social and 
economic activity led urbanists such as Saskia Sassen to popularize the view that cities were 
not disappearing in globalization; rather globalization entailed the emergence of a new type 
of city, the global city (Sassen, 1991)i. In short, while capitalist restructuring under 
conditions of globalization is rendering distance less of a barrier to the exchange and 
transfer of knowledge, commodities, and information in new global systems of production 
and consumption, cities enact a key strategic role in organising and structuring globalized 
forms of capital accumulation. Giving rise to the dominant global city discourse of the late-
twentieth and early twenty-first century many have since ascribed a hierarchy of 
importance to cities based on their geoeconomic power in creating, shaping, and 
orchestrating the operation of the global economy (Beaverstock et al., 1999). Some 
commentators even go so far as to attest that concentration of geoeconomic power in cities 
is so profound that major urban regions have now superseded national economies as the 
fundamental unit of the capitalist economy (Ohmae, 1995; Storper, 1997; Scott, 1998, 
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2001). Whether you agree with this assertion or not, the essential point is that in 
globalization capital is freeing itself from the shackles of historically entrenched nationally 
scaled regulatory systems which had kept capital accumulation contained within, and 
constrained by, territorially demarcated national economies during the epoch of Fordist 
industrial growth. We are witnessing, as many writers have noted, the rescaling of capital 
under globalizing conditions. 
Most crucially for this discussion, it is cities and metropolitan regions which have 
been foci for the crystallisation of globalized capital accumulation insofar as localised 
agglomeration economies foster and harbour the conditions, assets, and capacities upon 
which leading sectors of transnational capital depends (Brenner, 2004). The rescaling of 
capital has, in short, seen globalizing cities prosper from the rescaling of capital. Part and 
parcel of this discourse is how processes of global economic integration, rescaling of capital, 
and crystallisation of capital accumulation in subnational production complexes are fuelling 
a second defining feature of globalization – rapidly accelerating urbanisation. In stark 
contrast to the consensus of two decades ago, which signalled the demise of cities, today 
more than 50% of the world’s population are living in cities for the first time (UNFPA, 2007). 
With forecasts predicting this to rise to 70% by 2050 globalization is thus, on the one hand, 
fuelling claims of a resurgence of cities as drivers of economic development (and expected 
growing affluence). Yet, on the other hand, substantive expressions of rapidly accelerating 
urbanisation are increasingly challenging existing urban economic infrastructures and urban-
regional governance, particularly as metropolitan landscapes now stretch far beyond their 
traditional territorial boundaries. The extraordinarily rapid urbanisation underway in China, 
especially the Pearl River Delta, for instance, offers a vivid example of the challenges posed 
by city expansion into larger city-regions comprising multiple functionally interlinked urban 
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settlements. To be sure, this is a process which disturbs our established conceptions of the 
city as a distinctively coherent phenomenon in its own right, but also its place in the wider 
context of regional, national and international relations. 
Stirred into action by these developments, this century has seen a whole raft of 
research into the emergence of a new and critically important kind of geography and 
institutional form on the world stage, the global city-region. Showcased as a new scale of 
urban organisation, the global city-region discourse extends the logic which saw global cities 
being defined by their external linkages during the 1990s to consider both the external and 
internal linkages of these rapidly expanding, increasingly multi-clustered, metropolitan 
areas. Linked to their vigorous expansion and ever increasing economic activity as dense 
nodes of human, social, and cultural capital, many commentators purport these large-scale 
complex urban formations to “function as territorial platforms for much of the post-Fordist 
economy”, constitute the “dominant leading edge of contemporary capitalist development”, 
and thereby represent what many now believe to be the “basic motors of the global 
economy” (Scott, 2001: 4).  
Providing added impetus to this emergent global city-region discourse has been the 
emergence of trans-national, trans-regional and trans-frontier economic spaces in 
globalization: prominent examples include Europe’s ‘blue banana’, a discontinuous 
urbanised corridor of industrial growth running from northern England to northern Italy; the 
Dutch-German EUREGIO cross-border region; the Singapore-Johor-Riau growth triangle in 
south-east Asia; and the ‘Cascadia’ region in the Pacific north-west of North America. This is 
further supported as, among others, UN-Habitat (2011) move to recognise the merger of 
global cities and global city-regions to form even larger urban spaces as an indicator that 
there is a new and critically important sociospatial formation on the world stage. Stretching 
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for thousands of kilometres (often across national boundaries) and home not to tens of 
millions of people but hundreds of millions of people, these super-urban areasii are coming 
to represent this century’s competitive territories par excellence, a foci for and driver of 
wealth creation, and loci for new forms of territorial cooperation and competition on a 
previously unimagined scale. Moreover, and of particular note is that many of these super-
urban areas – certainly the most dynamic – are located outside of the traditional capitalist 
heartlands of North America and Western Europe. Some of the most prominent examples 
include the Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta and Bohai Economic Rim, Beijing-
Pyongyang-Seoul-Tokyo, Tokyo-Nagoya-Osaka-Kyoto-Kobe, Mumbai-Delhi, Rio de Janeiro-
Sao Paulo, and Ibadan-Lagos-Accra (see Box 1). 
 
*** Insert Box 1 here *** 
 
Irrespective of whether you perceive these spaces to be real or imagined, the mere fact 
these cross-border regional networks of interlinked cities are in the social consciousness as 
a result of their rapid expansion in number, size, and scope, is doing much to advance the 
claim that cities at the heart of major urban-regional industrial production complexes are 
acting quasi-autonomously, that is, outside territorial structures formally administered or 
governed by the nation-state (Scott, 2001). Giving rise to ‘unusual’ or ‘unbounded’ 
regionalism – the recognition that city-regions and/or regional networks of cities often do 
not conform to any known territorial entities but are constructed in ways that appear to 
defy hierarchical control (Deas and Lord, 2006) – it is hard to escape the conclusion that 
while cities are back it is not as we once knew them. 
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Against the background of deepening globalization the purpose of this chapter is to 
highlight the shifts accompanying the changing configuration of the urban economy, in 
particular those linked to the rescaling of the city and the emergence of new forms of urban 
economic space. To put work on cities and rescaling in context, we first need to distinguish 
between cities as we once knew them and cities as we now know them. To do this, the 
chapter explores the drift of cities away from national urban systems toward the orbit or 
gravity pull of international systems and global circuits of capital accumulation. In particular 
the chapter draws on Brenner’s (2004) distinction between ‘rescaling the geographies of 
capital’ and ‘rescaling the geographies of statehood’ to emphasise how the 
rehierarchization of the urban and regional system is only partly explained by economic 
factors (crisis-induced industrial restructuring, the rise of flexible production systems, new 
spatial divisions of labour); just as important are political factors (centrally orchestrated 
state strategies to promote transnational investment in major urban regions, 
governmentalized remapping of state spaces, the political-construction of an ‘elite’ top 
hierarchy of cities and urbanized regions within national and international circuits of 
capital). So in the next section the chapter explores the changing configuration of the urban 
economy before critically examining the role of the state as facilitator, orchestrator and 
enabler of changes to the urban economy in the second half of the chapter.  
 
Cities as we once knew them, cities as we now know them: the changing configuration of 
the urban economy 
Technological innovation, the rise of flexible production systems, and processes of 
deterritorialisation have all contributed in eroding the stability of historically entrenched 
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urban and regional hierarchies under globalizing conditions. During the era of Fordism, 
these urban and regional hierarchies were largely internalised by nationally-specific systems 
of productioniii. Today this is what we might call the ‘old order’, with areas designated 
according to their status as inter alia growth areas (those benefitting from Fordist 
accumulation), overgrowth areas (satellite towns, suburbs), and depressed areas (those 
problem areas in need of assistance). In nationally-specific contexts, this spatial hierarchy 
was then utilised by the state to redirect capital employment from growth areas to 
depressed areas according to the principles of spatial Keynesianism, that is, the need for the 
state intervention in redistributing resources to promote balanced urban and regional 
development through national scaled regulatory control of the space economy. 
Strategies of spatial Keynesianism were dominant during the Fordist period, 
particularly in Western Europe. In the United Kingdom, for example, the ‘postwar 
consensus’ which followed the 1940 Royal Commission on the Distribution of Industrial 
Population’s placement of a national duty on the UK government to control capital so as to 
prevent sociospatial inequality in general, and the overheating of London and the south east 
in particular, offers a vivid example of how strategies of spatial Keynesianism provided the 
backdrop for state-led urban and regional planning during the Fordist period. Similarly in 
France, indicative planning in the postwar period was implemented with the overarching 
aim of identifying potential oversupply, bottlenecks, and shortages in order that state 
investment decisions could be spatially targeted in a more timely way to reduce market 
disequilibrium. While in Germany, the first federal law on spatial planning (the 1965 
Bundersraumordnungsgesetz or ROG) established the basic aim of enabling territorial 
equilibrium; planners interpreting this to mean further accumulation of resources in major 
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cities should be avoided and should be targeted instead at those so-called ‘lagging’ rural and 
border zones which are not primary sources of capital accumulation.  
Dominant in the period 1940-1970, the relative stability afforded by the Fordist-
Keynesian institutional compromise was violently ruptured by the rapid decline in 
traditional manufacturing industries, a process which starved the Fordist growth dynamic of 
its lifeblood. Despite this, not all urban areas experienced the collapse of Fordism and its 
impacts to the same extent. But why was this? Well the answer rests, first, in the rise of 
flexible or ‘lean’ production systems (Harrison, 1994). The crisis of Fordism saw firms forced 
to switch from mass producing single products to a model of flexible specialization. This 
involved the production of diverse product lines targeted at specific groups of customers, 
requiring the use of non-specialist machinery and multi-skilled labour able to respond 
quickly and efficiently to market change. As part of a wider strategy to enhance efficiency 
and externalise risk, flexible specialization led to parts of the production process being 
outsourced or subcontracted on short-term contracts to a network of suppliers. In the first 
instance then, those traditional manufacturing firms, sectors, and locations which were able 
to restructure and quickly adopt flexible production systems were able to foreshorten the 
crisis and its effects. The classic example of this is the automobile industry – “the mass 
production industry par excellence” (Dicken, 2010: 339) – where mass production 
techniques were displaced by a system of lean production, led by highly efficient and cost-
competitive Japanese automobile firms (Toyota, Honda, Nissan) in the 1970s and copied 
subsequently by US and European car producers (Ford, GM, Fiat, Volkswagen, Renault). 
Nonetheless, this is only part of this particular story for, in addition, flexible production 
systems were also at the heart of three sectors which came to characterise, perhaps even 
determine, capitalism’s post-Fordist economic and geographic form – (1) high-technology 
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manufacturing; (2) revitalized design-intensive craft production; and (3) advanced producer 
and financial services (Storper and Scott, 1990).  
While the collapse of the Fordist mode of traditional mass production sent 
shockwaves through older industrial urban regions, these events were countered by the 
emergence of ‘new industrial spaces’ (Scott, 1988). Industrial regions such as Silicon Valley, 
Orange County, and Route 128 in the United States, along with Baden-Württemberg, 
Catalonia, Lombardy, Rhône-Alpes (the so-called ‘Four Motors of Europe’), and more 
recently Bangalore (the ‘Silicon Valley of India’) proved beacons of hope, demonstrating 
how certain industrial locations were successfully bucking the trend of national economic 
decline to emerge as ‘winners’ in the period after Fordism. Initial endeavours to account for 
these industrial developments chronicled wholesale shifts from Fordist mass production to 
post-Fordist flexible specialization (Piore and Sabel, 1984), old industrial spaces to new 
industrial spaces (Scott, 1988), and national economies to regional economies (Sabel, 1989). 
What they suggested was that owing to mass production technologies never being widely 
adopted in these exemplars of the post-Fordist growth dynamic, and their economies being 
vertically disintegrated and flexibly organised around high-levels of inter-firm coordination 
in high-technology sectors, their urban-economic form and infrastructure secured these 
regions a competitive territorial advantage in the new global economy. Nevertheless, these 
accounts proved too narrowly economistic in their search for explanation, often guilty of 
overlooking important social and political factors upon which the post-Fordist growth 
dynamic relies.  
In an insightful account into the formation of these new regional economic spaces of 
capital accumulation, Michael Storper highlights how just as important in globalizing forms 
of capital accumulation are those ‘soft’, ‘untraded interdependencies’ (such as rules of 
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action, customs, conventions, understandings and values) which constitute the “non-
material assets in production” (Storper, 1997: 192). Critically, this chimed with research 
being conducted by other economic geographers at the time – most notably Phil Cooke and 
Kevin Morgan’s work on ‘regional innovation networks’ in Europe. Their research into 
regional development in Baden-Württemberg, Emilia-Romagna, Wales, and the Basque 
country pinpointed how successful regional economies were those governed less by vertical 
relations of authority and dependence but by horizontal relations of cooperation and 
reciprocity (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). Echoing much of what Storper articulated in relation 
to ‘untraded interdependencies’, Cooke and Morgan believed horizontal relations of 
cooperation and reciprocity relied on those very same societal conventions. Trust, solidarity, 
loyalty and tolerance between the state, economic actors, and civil society stakeholders 
thereby came to be perceived as key to fostering dense local networks, where sharing trade 
and business information, technology and training becomes commonplace – a necessary 
component for post-Fordist capital accumulation. With this in place, it was argued, 
‘intelligent’ regions were formed, that is, regions which are able to exploit the transition 
toward globalizing forms of capital accumulation to their own advantage. One important 
consequence of this argument was the suggestion that regions were operating as quasi-
independent ‘actor spaces’, able to mobilise themselves to have a decisive influence on 
economic development, wealth distribution, and consolidating a sense of inclusiveness 
(Amin and Thrift, 1995). 
 Giving rise to what we have come to know in retrospect as the ‘new regionalism’, 
this body of literature established strong support for nationally-specific production systems 
being superseded in globalization by more localised industrial districts and regional 
innovation systems. This emerging political-economic orthodoxy suggested post-Fordist 
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capital accumulation required networked hubs comprising both ‘hard’ institutional 
structures and ‘soft’ institutional processes; the latter being best developed at local and 
regional levels because “this is the level at which regular inter-actions, one of the conditions 
for trust-building, can be sustained over time” (Morgan, 1997: 501). In regional studies, 
leading proponents of the ‘new regionalist’ orthodoxy were so convinced that major urban 
regions were the fundamental building blocks of economic and social life after Fordism they 
prophetically announced that we were coming to live in a ‘regional world’ (Ohmae, 1995; 
Storper, 1997). 
 Under conditions of globalization, areas which are well-resourced (containing large 
concentrations of transnational corporations, highly-skilled workers) and well-connected 
(within existing transportation and communications networks) have successfully exploited 
these crucial locational advantages to consolidate, increase, and further concentrate high-
level economic and industrial activity, alongside flows of foreign direct investment, skilled 
migrant labour and tourists at the expense of other less favoured locations (Brenner, 
2009b). For this reason, alongside those new urban and regional industrial zones, global 
cities have likewise proved to be loci for industries with flexible production systems. One 
sector in particular locates almost exclusively in global cities, and that is the advanced 
producer and financial services sector. Advanced producer and financial service functions 
(advertising, banking, financial consultancy and management, insurance, real estate) give 
elite global cities a monopoly over what is the indicator of choice for most analyses into the 
functionality of global cities, that is, the measure by which cities are ranked according to 
their command and control over global circuits of capital accumulationiv. This monopoly is 
reinforced by recognition that not only do advanced producer and financial services cluster 
in global cities, these industries which serve the demands of transnational capital and its 
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thirst for enhanced command and control over space on a global scale have expanded 
rapidly over the past forty years. In this way, advanced producer and financial services are a 
classic example of how for all the talk of deterritorialisation, the collapse of distance, and 
transition to a borderless world what we are witnessing is the emergence and consolidation 
of a series of global command and control points that are assuming greater importance as 
power is localised in an increasingly select number of place-specific, wealth generating 
locations. 
The essential point here is that even in an era of global economic integration, 
characterised by increased capital mobility, the expansion of transnational finance capital, 
and formation of global production networks, capital will exploit favourable local and 
regionally specific conditions of production to secure competitive advantage. Such 
arguments have given rise to what we have now come to recognise as the rescaling and 
reterritorialisation of capital under globalizing conditions (Brenner, 2004). This is the notion 
that for all capital has been able to release itself from the shackles of national scaled 
regulatory control, it is forced to (re)produce new and/or modify existing sociospatial 
infrastructure at supranational and subnational scales to create the conditions necessary for 
capital accumulation. It is here, for reasons noted above, that major urban cores and new 
regional industrial districts are able to exploit their place- and territory-specific location 
advantages to prosper in globalization.  
 
Cities in globalization – the changing urban order 
Much of the last two decades has been spent documenting the impacts this rescaling of 
capital has had on particular geographical location across the globe. Specifically, research 
has been documenting how the rescaling of capital has been highly uneven, leading to even 
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more pronounced forms of spatial division (any social and economic inequality), at every 
scale. Three are worth mentioning here. First, the tendency toward metropolitan 
polarisation described above has ensured that being a national and major region centre is 
not enough in the era of globalized capital accumulation. As urban competitiveness 
becomes increasingly reliant on the demands of transnational capital, in turn dependent on 
the presence of specialised producer and financial services, the formation of a network of 
global cities in which command and control functions are centralised have created a new 
tier of highly connected, elite level cities. Over the past decade, the Globalization and World 
Cities (GaWC) research group have developed a world city network model which deepens 
our understanding of how cities are increasingly connected across space as part of capitalist 
strategies to position cities within global circuits of capital accumulationv.  
 
*** Insert Box 2 here *** 
 
What the GaWC analysis shows is that even within this tier of highly connected, elite level 
cities there are distinct tendencies of developmental/growth divergence. The first 
observation to make is the general rise of connectivity in this network of upper-tier cities 
(Taylor et al., 2010). The second is how London, New York and Hong Kong remain the most 
connected cities, in effect the ‘capital’ global cities to the three major networks of global 
cities in the world city network – the west European (London, Paris, Milan, Madrid), north 
American (New York, Toronto, Chicago) and Pacific-Asian (Hong Kong, Singapore, Tokyo, 
Sydney, Shanghai, Beijing). Below this, and not represented by the table, there is a Latin 
American network (Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo, Mexico City) and an emerging east European 
network (Moscow, Warsaw, Istanbul). Highlighting the global dimension of these city 
15 | P a g e  
 
networks, Africa is the only area one might suggest is ‘off the map’ with Johannesburg the 
sole representative in the top 50 (cf. Robinson, 2002). Nevertheless, this does not mean 
African cities are disconnected from the global economy, just less well connected. This is 
evidenced in the latest findings which highlight how eleven African cities have global 
connectivity scores more than 10% that of London (Wall, 2010); a point which repeats 
earlier findings leading Taylor et al. to conclude “all cities can be characterised to some 
degree as both ‘world’ and ‘global’ in nature. Hence, they are all ‘cities in globalization’.” 
(2007: 15). A third observation is that while the top level remains relatively constant, with 
London, New York, Hong-Kong occupying positions 1-3, and Paris, Singapore, Tokyo 
positions 4-6, there has been remarkable fluctuation elsewhere in the top 20. The European 
cities of Frankfurt, Zurich and Amsterdam have all dropped out of the top 20, along with the 
US cities of Los Angeles and San Francisco. They are being overtaken and replaced by the 
Pacific Asian cities, Shanghai, Beijing, Mumbai, Seoul and Kuala Lumpur, showing that 
services are rising fast to complement the regions established manufacturing prowess as the 
new ‘workshop of the world’. Other cities making a notable rise are Moscow, spearheading 
a revival of cities emerging from their communist past to become well connected in 
international circuits of capitalist accumulation, and Buenos Aires, emerging as the major 
economic gateway to Latin America. One important consequence of this is functions once 
located in national capitals and major regional centres are being concentrated in a select 
number of global cities whose function is as a gateway to the global economy for what are 
now much larger, increasingly transnational, networks of national capitals and major 
regional centres (Brenner, 2009b). 
All of which has produced a new elite level of cities that act as important gateways, 
articulating regional and national economies into the global economy. But the rescaling of 
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capital has also seen a development and growth divergence among cities within national 
urban systems. For the observed shift from what we come to identify as the ‘old’ industrial 
spaces of Fordist accumulation to ‘new’ industrial spaces of post-Fordist capital 
accumulation has led national urban hierarchies to be recalibrated as industrial production 
polarised in the most economically advantageous subnational production complexes. In the 
US, this saw industrial production, and as a result urban development, switch from the 
‘snowbelt’ cities of Detroit and Pittsburgh in the north and east to the rapidly expanding 
‘sunbelt’ boomtowns of Houston and Tucson in the south and west. This was mirrored in 
Europe. In Germany, for example, the boom regions were no longer those centred on the 
cities of Cologne, Essen, and Hamburg in the north but those newly dynamic cities of 
Frankfurt, Munich and Stuttgart to the south. In England, the same situation saw the 
traditional industrial heartlands of the Midlands and the North eclipsed by the rise of 
Cambridge and the M4/M11 corridors in the south east, while in Italy, dynamic post-Fordist 
economic growth is centred on a rapidly expanding industrial triangle around Milan, Turin, 
and Genoa in the north of the country. The second process we can identify where the 
rescaling of capital has led to more pronounced forms of spatial division, what emerges in 
each national space economy is an interurban network where industrial activity and urban 
development is polarised. Of late, the extension of this observed pattern of interurban 
polarisation sees interurban networks which are transnational in nature: as evidenced by 
Europe’s ‘blue banana’, which connects London at its north-westerly apex with inter alia 
Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Strasbourg, before reaching its south-easterly 
apex in Milan; NY-LON/PAR-LON, concepts used by commentators to emphasise strong 
transnational ties between particular cities in this network of cities, in this case New York-
London and Paris-London; and super-urban areas, most notably in NICs/BRIC (see Box 1). 
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A third important process sees divergence in the levels and/or degrees of primacy in 
different national urban systems. If we again use the most recent GaWC analysis as a 
starting point a number of important observations can be made (Taylor et al., 2010). First, 
there is a strong tendency towards primacy in many of the traditionally advanced capitalist 
nations. In the United Kingdom, for example, London remains the most globally connected 
city but the next city in line, Manchester, is only ranked 113th with a connectivity of 22% 
that of London. A similar picture emerges in France with Paris fourth but the next most 
connected city, Lyon, ranked 145th with a connectivity only 18% that of London. These are 
the most prominent examples of a primate city system. A very different picture emerges in 
China, however, where 6 cities (Hong Kong, Shanghai, Beijing, Taipei, Guangzhou, and 
Shenzhen) have global connectivity scores 25% or more that of London. Germany also has 6 
cities with a global connectivity 25% or more that of London but what it lacks in comparison 
to China are cities at the apex of global connectivity. While once firmly established in the 
top 20, in 2008 Frankfurt once again found itself the highest ranked German city, but only 
32nd overall with a proportionate connectivity half that of London. With Berlin (55), 
Hamburg (60), Munich (67), Dusseldorf (76) and Stuttgart (91), Germany emerges as the 
exemplar of a ‘horizontal’ urban system (Hoyler, 2010): albeit one which shows German 
cities to be experiencing a relative decline in their overall global network connectivity. The 
US, by contrast, shows evidence of being both a ‘primate city’ and ‘horizontal urban’ 
system: the former evidenced by the second-ranked city, Chicago, having a connectivity 
score 57% that of New York; the latter by 15 US cities having a global connectivity score 
higher than Manchester and 20 cities a score higher than Lyon (Taylor et al., 2010). 
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 It is clear from this analysis how the collapse of the Fordist growth dynamic in the 
1970s and the major economic structural changes which have followed led to a drift of cities 
away from national urban systems toward the orbit or gravity pull of supranational circuits 
of capital accumulation, alongside both a developmental and growth divergence among 
cities within national urban systems. What is less clear is the role the state has played in 
this, and it is to this question that the chapter now turns. 
 
What role the state? 
For sure, the state’s trusted Keynesian macro-economic policy instruments which had 
proved effective in maintaining regulatory order during the Fordist era quickly became 
ineffectual in coping with the global economic crises of the 1970s. Quite simply, as national 
state space became increasingly permeable to untold myriad of transnational flows of 
capital, knowledge, commodities, labour, and information, nationally-configured regulatory 
frameworks, institutions and supports which had proved effective foundations for Fordist-
Keynesian regulatory strategies were unsettled and forced to undergo major restructuring 
as the process of capital accumulation was globalized. Where controversy and debate 
emerges is that there are two schools of thought on what affect this major restructuring to 
the mode of regulation has had on the state. On one side there are those who believe state 
power is being eroded as national infrastructures are dismantled and replaced by new forms 
of political-economic regulation at supranational (e.g. WTO, IMF, European Union, NAFTA, 
ASEAN) and subnational levels (e.g. urban and regional governance). From this perspective 
the restructuring and rescaling of state power away from the national level to organisations 
and agencies enforcing neoliberal, market-led strategies at supranational and subnational 
levels signals the extent to which nation states have lost their ability to control and regulate 
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the movement of capital across space, and leads authors such as Ohmae (1995) to proclaim 
‘the end of the nation-state’. On the other side there are those of us who believe that this 
major restructuring does not come at the expense of the state; in accordance with some 
kind of either/or, zero-sum, logic which appears to underpin arguments made by those 
signalling the demise of the state. Albeit never forgetting that contemporary processes of 
state restructuring were crisis-induced, the argument put forward here is that the state is 
not the victim, but a key architect, of these processes of geoeconomic integration. Building 
on the pioneering work of predecessors such as Bob Jessop, Neil Brenner’s attempt to 
decipher how ‘new state spaces’ are being produced under contemporary capitalism has 
opened our eyes to the way in which the state has reconfigured its spatial and organisation 
structures to maintain control over urban and regional development (Brenner, 2004); in the 
process disturbing notions of the powerless state and premature announcements 
proclaiming the death of the nation-state. Opening the black box on the rescaling of state 
power, Brenner’s eloquent reasoning on this is worth quoting at length: 
 
“Even as national states attempt to fracture or dismantle the institutional 
compromise of postwar Fordist-Keynesian capitalism in order to reduce domestic 
production costs, they have also devolved substantial regulatory responsibilities to 
regional and local institutions, which are seen to be better positioned to promote 
industrial (re)development within major urban and regional economies. This 
downscaling of regulatory tasks should not be viewed as a contraction or abdication 
of national state power, however, for it has frequently served as a centrally 
orchestrated strategy to promote transnational capital investment within major 
urban regions, whether through public funding of large-scale infrastructural projects, 
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the establishment of new forms of public-private partnerships or other public 
initiatives intended to enhance urban territorial competitiveness.” (Brenner, 2004: 
61-62). 
 
Related to this Brenner goes on to introduce the twin concepts of state spatial projects and 
state spatial strategies: the former referring to the organisational divisions of the state 
which, albeit increasingly located at multiple scales, are being organised and coordinated to 
re-established coherence to the regulatory system; the latter alerting us to how state 
policies are increasingly spatially selective, with intervention privileging certain spaces over 
others and bringing about geographical variation among state activities. State spatial 
strategies are important in this discussion because what we have witnessed since the 
collapse of Fordism is the widespread abandonment of traditional Keynesian models of 
regional policy in favour of new national strategies designed to make major urban regions 
attractive to transnational capital. In short, nation-states began to actively encourage, 
facilitate and shape geoeconomic integration. For cities were no longer seen to be passive 
containers of all the socioeconomic ills leftover from the collapse of Fordism but dynamic 
growth engines at the heart of what Brenner (1998: 8) identified as a new “city-centric 
capitalism”. To be sure, the task of positioning cities strategically within global circuits of 
capital accumulation became an officially institutionalised task and goal for policy elites the 
world over. But while we can identify much that is uniform in how this task has been 
approached, some notable differences have undoubtedly contributed to the developmental 
and growth divergence among cities identified above; differences perhaps best illustrated 
by the spatial strategies adopted in the United Kingdom and Germany.  
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 During the 1980s, growth in London and the south east of England was heralded as 
the ‘textbook’ example of how major urban regions were able to pull away from the rest of 
the country due to their locational advantages in being able to attract transnational capital. 
Nevertheless, this representation of London and the south east as a successful growth 
region “did not simply fall into place; it had to be produced” (Allen et al., 1998: 10). And 
produced it was. The neoliberal strategies of liberalisation and deregulation pursued by 
Margaret Thatcher and her Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, proved extremely 
successful in strategically placing London (as global city) and south east England (as global 
city-region) at the apex of the European and global urban hierarchy. It was part of a political 
strategy, known as Thatcherism, which made the conditions right for attracting 
transnational capital. Inflation was controlled, taxes lowered, exchange rate controls 
abolished, trade unionism restrained, state industries privatized, and finance deregulated in 
the belief that free market competition would see the price of products and services 
decrease and their quality increase.  
All of which propelled London to global city status. But it also saw London and the 
south east singled-out for growth, with the central state concerned primarily with 
promoting London’s competitiveness as a world financial centre. Perhaps most famously, 
the ‘Big Bang’ reform of 27 October 1986 saw restrictions on financial lending lifted as part 
of a fundamental reform of the London Stock Exchange. A decision which strengthened 
London’s place as finance capital, the Big Bang became the cornerstone of the Thatcher 
Government’s neoliberal reforms. At home, it encouraged financial lending, which fuelled a 
housing boom in the south east, as mortgage lending increased, and a consumer boom, as 
personal credit became easily accessible. Internationally, it exposed London’s financial 
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markets to a more competitive world, which in turn led to more jobs in the financial and 
professional services, led to an increase in high-wage earners, which in turn fuelled the 
consumption boom as demand for other products and services increased. In short, it 
presented London and the south east as a dynamic growth region when many other regions 
appeared depressed; a perception constructed both materially and discursively by the state.  
Not only did the Thatcher Government’s neoliberal reforms prioritise financial 
capital and single-out London and the south east for growth, the central state rolled-back 
regional aid, thereby starving the declining cities and regions of northern and western 
Britain of the traditional compensatory adjustment measure of regional policy under spatial 
Keynesianism, and abolished regional government, so as to depower dissenting opposition 
from industrial capital and manufacturing workers. In place of the former, massive public 
sector investment was channelled into making London and the south east attractive to 
transnational capital, most notably the development of Canary Wharf as a new financial 
district in London’s Dockland. In place of the latter, new local and regional agencies were 
created in accordance with the state-rescaling thesis; albeit in the case of the UK, one where 
the state maintained a very dominant and controlling hand. Conceptualised as the states 
tendency toward centrally orchestrated localism and regionalism (Harrison, 2008), evidence 
for the state continuing to prioritise London and the south east can be seen in (amongst 
other   things) recent ‘city-region’ policy initiatives – with £22bn of public sector investment 
pumped into four city-region growth areas in the south east, while the equivalent project in 
the north of England received a meagre £100m (Harrison, 2011).  
It is hard to escape the conclusion then that state spatial strategies have played a 
critical role in producing the UK’s primate city system. Nonetheless, the same can be said for 
23 | P a g e  
 
Germany which, as noted above, exhibits all the tendencies of a horizontal urban system. 
For albeit the Federal State responded to the challenges of European integration and the 
intensification of globalization by prioritising the reconcentration of resources into major 
urban regions, this growth was to be in multiple urban regions. Two key political factors are 
important in explaining this. The first relates to Germany’s lack of what we might deem an 
exceptional city. Whereas both London and Paris had by the 1970s acquired exceptional 
status in their respective national urban hierarchies, Germany had a number of urban 
regions at the apex of their urban hierarchy. In part this can be explained by German 
separation and the prevention of Berlin from acquiring a similar exceptional position in the 
urban hierarchy. Part can also be explained by the Federal Government’s 1965 spatial 
planning law (Raumordnungsgesetz) which stated how a spatially equally distributed system 
of central places should be created to ensure balanced economic growth and territorial 
equilibrium across Germany. Meanwhile second and somewhat related to this latter point, 
Germany has a much stronger decentralised state system than the UK which has meant it is 
not a politically viable option to prioritise a single urban region to the extent successive UK 
Government’s have done with London. In addition, the Federal Government used this 
decentralised state system to push each major urban region toward achieving a functional 
specialisation, with Frankfurt establishing itself as finance capital, Hamburg as the centre for 
print-media, Munich as a centre for publishing and film industry, and so on.  
More recently, the decision to reassign Berlin as national capital of the reunified 
Germany in June 1991 led many to consider whether this signalled the beginning of a 
process whereby Berlin was being singled out for the reconcentration of functionsvi; further 
fuelled by the controversial redevelopment of Potsdammer Platz and the construction of 
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the new government district during the 1990s. Nevertheless, the Federal Government’s new 
spatial planning laws reaffirm the critical role played by the state in explaining 
developmental and growth divergence among cities in national urban systems. Responding 
to the challenge of positioning major cities and regions within supranational circuits of 
capital accumulation, the Federal Government strategically selected six agglomerations 
(Berlin/Brandenburg, Hamburg, Munich, Rhine-Main, Rhine-Ruhr and Stuttgart) to be 
‘European Metropolitan Regions’, that is, major urban regions deemed to be of ‘superior’ 
strategic importance (BmBau, 1995). Quite simply, it was recognition that although these 
major urban regions assumed various national tasks and formed important clusters in key 
areas of business activity, human capital, information and technology exchange, cultural 
experience and political engagement, Germany does not have an exceptional (global) city; 
what it has instead are a number of cities which are well positioned within European circuits 
of capital. In other words the inherited institutional and spatial arrangements, themselves 
the legacy of previous state spatial project and state spatial strategies, have, in part, 
produced Germany’s horizontal urban system, which in turn is now influencing decisions 
made by the Federal Government in responding to the task of positioning major urban 
regions in supranational circuits of capital accumulation (on this, see Harrison and Growe, 
2010). All of which is a sure sign the state has played, is playing, and will continue to play a 
critical role in encouraging and facilitating geoeconomic integration, and as a direct 
consequence, in positioning cities in national and international urban systems, networks, 
and hierarchies. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
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It is perhaps timely that this chapter is written exactly twenty years after Sassen’s (1991) 
The Global City – London, Tokyo, New York became the antecedent to the global city 
discourse and some ten years since Allen Scott’s (2001) edited collected Global City-Regions 
– Trends, Theory, Policy did likewise for the global city-region discourse. Against the 
backdrop of deepening globalization both came at key junctures, helping us to understand 
the changing role, form, and function of the major cities in the world in an era of 
unprecedented economic restructuring. Alongside this, the current chapter has drawn on 
Brenner’s distinction between the rescaling of capital and rescaling the state to reinforce 
the importance of recognising that for all capital has been seen to release itself from the 
shackles of national scaled regulatory control, the very fact it is forced to (re)produce new 
and/or modify existing sociospatial infrastructure at supranational and subnational scales to 
create the conditions necessary for capital accumulation requires a reterritorialisation of 
capital. Simply stated, capital is not as ‘free’ as many hyper-globalists would have us believe.  
What this chapter has shown is how the state actively encourages global economic 
integration. Evidence suggests that while the rise of neoliberalism and its market-driven 
approach to economic and social policy has been accompanied by a rolling back of the state, 
states have not only reconfigured their own institutional form to forge an ability to centrally 
orchestrate urban and regional development, but where they do intervene is often in 
response to the challenge of global economic integration and the goal of positioning their 
major cities and city-regions strategically within supranational circuits of capital 
accumulation. This can clearly be seen in the examples of the United Kingdom and Germany 
described above where the state intervened to create new, or modify existing, sociospatial 
infrastructure at the urban and regional level to, first, create the conditions necessary for 
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capital accumulation, and second, make their major urban region(s) more attractive to 
transnational capital than their international competitors.  
Thus, the future developmental and growth divergence among cities within national 
urban systems, the rescaling of the city, and emergence of new forms of (transnational) 
economic spaces will not only be shaped by inherited institutional and spatial arrangements, 
but by how states reconfigure their institutional form in response to rapid urbanisation and 
global economic integration continuing apace, related demands for more ‘appropriate’ 
(widely understood to mean more flexible, networked and smart) forms of urban and 
regional planning and governance arrangements, and new loci and/or expressions of inter- 
and intra-urban territorial cooperation and conflict around questions to do with increased 
competitiveness, resilience, new economic developments, infrastructure, the collective 
provision of services, and governmentalised remappings of urban and regional space. In this 
context then, this chapter highlights how it is timely to ask some searching questions about 
these new territorial dynamics and politics, to begin the process of developing appropriate 
vocabularies for mapping and conceptualising the transforming urban economic landscape, 
and to explore the successes and failures of responses to the profound practical challenges 
posed by global economic integration and rapid urbanisation. One important question it re-
raises is by whom and for whom these new economic spaces are being defined, delimited 
and designated as competitive territories par excellence. Undoubtedly a daunting challenge, 
it is one we as researchers need to scale in order to deepen our understanding of both the 
economic and political processes underpinning the contemporary urban condition.  
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PEDAGOGIC GUIDE 
Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) Research Network (http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/): 
Based at Loughborough University (UK) GaWC is the leading academic think-tank on cities in 
globalization. The GaWC website contains 380+ research bulletins and 25 data sets on cities 
in globalization. 
UN-Habitat (http://www.unhabitat.org) is the United Nations agency for human 
settlements, and publisher of the bi-annual State of World Cities report which identifies 
current and future trends of urban dwelling. 
Metropolis (http://www.metropolis.org) is the World Association of Major Metropolises. 
Created in 1985, the Metropolis Association is represented by more than 100 members 
from across the world and operates as an international forum for exploring issues and 
concerns common to all big cities and metropolitan regions. 
City Mayors (http://www.citymayors.com): Established in 2003 and maintained by the City 
Mayors Foundation, this website deals with all aspects of urban affairs, including: city 
rankings, governance structures, and issues facing cities in areas ranging from economic and 
investment, business, culture, development, environment, transports, education and health.  
City Population (http://www.citypopulation.de/world/Agglomerations.html): Provides an 
up to date list of all agglomerations of the world with a population of one million 
inhabitants. This was Scott’s starting point for identifying the ‘global city-region’ as the 
pivotal sociospatial formation in globalization, and the data presented here identifies the 
483 cities in the world which have a population of more than one million. 
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BOX 1: Selected examples of dynamic super-urban areas in NICs/BRICvii 
Pearl River Delta (PRD): China’s southernmost and largest super-urban area, it is estimated 
that a growing population of 120m live in the area around Hong Kong, Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou. Here Hong Kong has emerged to be an important service-oriented hub and 
gateway to the PRD, where Guangdong Province is one of the world’s most important 
manufacturing bases. The PRD administrative area covers 42,824 sq km. There have been 
suggestions, albeit refuted by the Guangdong Provincial Authority, that they plan to merge 
the nine mainland cities (current population c. 40m) to create one urban metropolis. 
Yangtze River Delta (YRD): China’s second largest super-urban area, the YRD administrative 
area covers of 110,115 sq km and has a population of 90m. Located on the East China Sea, 
the YRD is centred on 16 cities of which Shanghai, Nanjing and Hangzhou are the most 
prominent. Shanghai is mainland China’s financial centre, but where the PRD focuses on 
light consumer goods, the YRD is more focused on heavy industry. The Ports of Shanghai 
and Ningbo are the world’s first and fourth busiest cargo ports respectively.  
Bohai Economic Rim (BER): Although the least heralded of China’s three super-urban areas, 
the BER is emerging as an important economic hotspot to rival the PRD and YRD. Situated 
around the Bohai Sea, China’s northernmost super-urban area has a growing population of 
c.60m. Centred on the cities of Beijing and Tianjin, the BER has traditionally been involved in 
heavy industry and manufacturing, but one of the issues was always the lack of integration 
between cities in the rim and the BER to Shanghai (mainland China’s financial centre). The 
Beijing-Tianjin Intercity Railway (the world’s fastest conventional train service on opening in 
2008, reducing travel times from 70 to 30 minutes) and the Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed 
Railway (opened June 2011, halving the travel time to 4½hrs) are examples of how the 
Government are prioritising the integration of the BER and in so doing uncorking its 
economic development potential. 
Beijing-Pyongyang-Seoul-Tokyo: On a much larger scale, the Bohai Economic Rim is also 
located in a much larger super-urban area with Pyongyang (North Korea), Seoul (South 
Korea) and Tokyo (Japan). Connecting 77 cities with populations over 200,000, over 97m 
people currently live in this super-urban area which stretches for 1,500km. 
Tokyo-Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto-Nagoya: Like Beijing, Tokyo is also located in a second super-
urban area. Unlike the former which connects four megalopolises in four countries, this 
super-urban area is located solely within Japan. But with a population predicted to hit 60m 
by 2015 this is double the size of the largest global city-region.  
Mumbai-Delhi: Another 1,500km urban corridor stretches from Jawaharlal Nehru Port in 
Navi Mumbai on the west coast to Dadri and Tughlakabad in Delhi at the very northern edge 
of India. This industrial corridor connects two cities with populations currently in excess of 
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40m and is seen as an emerging economy with the potential to become Central Asia’s super-
urban area. 
Rio de Janeiro-Sao Paulo: More than 43m live in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo in Brazil and 
the area inbetween. This 430km urban corridor is also seen as an emerging economy with 
the potential to become a South American super-urban area. 
Ibadan-Lagos-Accra (ILA): The 600km ILA urban corridor is the engine of West Africa’s 
expanding economy. Actually linking 5 cities (Ibadan, Lagos, Cotonou, Lome, Accra), each 
separated by 100-125km and spread across 4 countries (Nigeria, Benin, Togo Ghana), 
conservative estimates suggest around 25m people live in this industrialising economy. 
Perhaps more foresight is required in this example, but with 20m people living in the major 
cities and with an emerging and expanding economy, this economic hotspot could one day 
represent sub-Saharan Africa’s super-urban area. 
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BOX 2: ‘Top 20’ most connected cities in terms of their ‘global network connectivity’ (GNC) 
in 2000 and 2008. Source: Taylor et al. (2010: 339) 
 
2000 2008 
RANK CITY GNC RANK CITY GNC 
1 London 100.00 1 New York 100.00 
2 New York 97.10 2 London 99.32 
3 Hong Kong 73.08 3 Hong Kong 83.41 
4 Tokyo 70.64 4 Paris 79.68 
5 Paris 69.72 5 Singapore 76.15 
6 Singapore 66.61 6 Tokyo 73.62 
7 Chicago 61.18 7 Sydney 70.93 
8 Milan 60.44 8 Shanghai 69.06 
9 Madrid 59.23 9 Milan 69.05 
10 Los Angeles 58.75 10 Beijing 67.65 
11 Sydney 58.06 11 Madrid 65.95 
12 Frankfurt 57.53 12 Moscow 64.85 
13 Amsterdam 57.10 13 Brussels 63.63 
14 Toronto 56.92 14 Seoul 62.74 
15 Brussels 56.51 15 Toronto 62.38 
16 Sao Paulo 54.26 16 Buenos Aires 60.62 
17 San Francisco 50.43 17 Mumbai 59.48 
18 Zurich 48.42 18 Kuala Lumpur 58.44 
19 Taipei 48.22 19 Chicago 57.57 
20 Jakarta 47.92 20 Taipei 56.07 
Cities that rise into the 
top 20 in 2008 
Cites that fall out of the  
top 20 in 2008 
22 Buenos Aires 46.81 21 Sao Paulo 55.96 
23 Mumbai 46.81 22 Zurich 55.51 
27 Shanghai 43.95 25 Amsterdam 54.60 
28 Kuala Lumpur 43.53 28 Jakarta 53.29 
29 Beijing 43.43 31 Frankfurt 51.58 
30 Seoul 42.32 40 Los Angeles 45.18 
37 Moscow 40.76 46 San Francisco 41.35 
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i
 I use ‘popularise’ deliberately because other authors had previously noted a new role for cities in 
globalization (see Friedman and Wolff, 1982; Timberlake, 1985), however it was Sassen who crystallised these 
thoughts into a concise research agenda and it is this which became the antecedent to what we know today as 
the global city discourse. Interestingly, other authors felt this presumptuous at the time. In their 1989 book,  
Richard Knight and Gary Gappert write: “THE TITLE OF THIS VOLUME, Cities in a Global Society, is rather 
presumptuous because it anticipates the global society; but it is less presumptuous than the original title, 
“Global Cities”, which implies that global cities already exist” (p. 11). 
ii
 Various other titles have been ascribed to these social formations, including ‘mega regions’, ‘urban corridors’, 
‘megapolitan cities’ and ‘endless cities’ but I would argue that in so doing each serves to stretch, and by 
implication blunt, established concepts such as ‘region’, ‘corridor’ and ‘city’ to identify these new spaces. For 
this reason I prefer to use the term super-urban areas. 
iii
 A fantastic visual representation of this national hierarchy of cities and regions can be found in Robert 
Dickinson’s (1964: 388) book ‘City and Region – A Geographical Representation’. It identifies a hierarchy of 1
st
, 
2
nd
, 3
rd
 and 4
th
 order cities in each national territory of Western Europe.  Reprinted in Brenner (2004: 122). 
iv
 It must be noted that this data can only be used as an indicator. It does not equate that the most connected 
cities are necessarily those with the most power over global circuits of capital accumulation, but it is the 
closest researchers have come to interpreting the changing geography of the world economy through a critical 
lens. 
v
 While the GaWC methodology arguably represents the most comprehensive approach to mapping and 
analysing inter-city relations and their importance in globalization, it does not go uncontested. In the context 
of this chapter, perhaps the most notable critique comes from Jennifer Robinson (2006) who, writing from a 
post colonial perspective, identifies how a focus on global cities does not adequate represent, and thereby 
under emphasises the importance of, cities of the global south. For more on this and other critiques, plus how 
the GaWC methodology has been revised over time see Beaverstock et al. (2011: 190-1). 
vi
 A similar process had occurred previously when the German Reich favoured Berlin as capital, leading to a 
concentration of resources in the city and prompting large population growth in the 50 years prior to World 
War 2. 
vii
 The source of much of this data is the UN Habitat (2011) State of the World’s Cities Report 2010/2011. 
